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FOREWORD
THis report has been prepared in response to an action
item issued Sept. 1974 by NASA Headquarters, MTE, requesting infor -
mation on a proposed joint USAF/NASA space servicing flight test
demonstration of automated payloads. This report develops the economic
benefits of such a concept when applied to the broad spectrum of future
NASA and domestic payload opportunities as a basis for emphasizing the
need for immediate action. The concept of space servicing is extended
from automated payloads to space based operations which eventually
lead to manned maintenance activities in geostationary orbit.
This provides the background for developing an overall plan
for a space servicing pilot program as the first step of an evolutionary
process to achieve operational capability when the full capability Tug
becomes operational. Several options, employing for the most part
existing flight hardware, are discussed and associated program costs
are developed.
This effort has been performed as a part of Study 2. 1,
Manned System Utilization Analysis, one of five studies currently in
process at The Aerospace Corporation under NASA contract NASW 2727.
The NASA Study Director is Mr. V. N. Huff, NASA Headquarters, Code MTE.
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SUMMARY
The concept of space servicing of automated payloads offers
the potential for substantial cost benefits for future payload operations.
Moreover, space servicing of automated payloads, especially in geosta-
tionary orbit, provides the impetus to begin an evolutionary process that
will expand the horizons of future space operations, leading to space assem-
bly, space basing, and manned maintenance operations. But developing
a new operational concept is a difficult task under most circumstances,
and under tight budgetary constraints, it is nearly impossible. The uncer-
tainty in cost estimates, the risk of changing design techniques, and the
operational uncertainties all militate against change. However, the
results of this study, as well as associated study efforts, strongly suggest
that this process of change should be initiated now to assure continued
growth of Shuttle applications in the future.
The results provided in this report indicate conservatively,
that over $200 million can be saved over an 11-yr period by employing
space servicing. Further optimization of the designs and operational
procedures should provide even further benefits. These savings, therefore,
can be used to balance the developmental costs required to achieve this
capability. Although no firm estimate of DDT&E costs can be made, it
is apparent that even these conservative returns will be sufficient to
justify the effort.
Experience has shown, however, that any major change of
course such as this must be an evolutionary process, allowing confidence
in the concept to be developed prior to a full commitment of efforts. Pay-
load programs will not automatically accept a new operational concept.
The economic benefits must be proven and applied against the anticipated
risk that is inherent in any new process. One approach to accomplish this
objective is through a flight test demonstration effort involving payload
users to overcome the inertia involved with current practices. Such a pro-
gram must also provide the first step to broader applications and assure
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that the initial investment has a relatively high change of subsequent benefits.
A program plan is presented which accomplishes these
objectives with a relatively low investment. Two options are devel-
oped which have application to both NASA and USAF future program
efforts and, therefore, through shared funding provide a capability
which probably could not be achieved otherwise. Although specific
design approaches are shown, it is not the intent to specify a preferred
approach at this point in time because incorporation of alternate test
objectives could impact the final selection. It is important to note,
however, that existing equipment can be employed to a very large
extent, minimizing the risk of new developmental items. It is also
important to recognize that this program has the potential to evolve
directly into an interim servicing capability, providing not only funda-
mental design and operational requirements but also hardware elements.
The total effort is estimated to cost approximately $25
million shared by NASA and the USAF. Full commitment to these funds is
not required until firm design approaches and cost data are available from
contractor efforts. An initial effort is recommended in the last half of
FY 75 to establish mission requirements and design specifications and to
develop the procurement package for FY 76. The funding levels for FY 76
require approximately $2 million each from NASA and the USAF. How-
ever, only about one-half of this is required to reach the critical design
review (CDR) on all development items. At that point in time, the design
will be firm, the interface specifications will be firm, and firm costing
can be committed. The decision can then be made to proceed or repro-
gram as necessary. Hence, the commitment up to this time is little
more than the current study efforts investigating various space servic-
ing concepts.
Experience has shown that study results alone may not alter
the course of current payload program efforts. Operational procedures
must be demonstrated and the associated risk of development must be over-
come. The Pilot Program recommended serves as a first step in develop-
ing this confidence in a new operational concept which should provide bene-
fits to the payload user as well as to the Space Transportation System.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of space servicing of automated payloads offers
the potential for substantial cost benefits for future payload operations.
However, as with any new operational concept, there is always a risk
associated with changing the normal mode of business. Assessing the
risk against potential benefits is a task which often is not quantifiable,
and is, therefore, referred to the judgment of top management. It is,
therefore, desirable to provide as much background information on the
subject as possible to assure that a management decision is made in the
light of all pertinent viewpoints. That is the purpose of this report rela-
tive to space servicing in general, and a pilot flight test program in
particular.
This report provides the background information leading
to the recommendation for an early flight test to demonstrate space ser-
vicing. It also provides an overall program plan, building upon the pilot
program, through an interim servicing capability to arrive at a multi-
payload servicing concept at the time the full capability Tug becomes
operational. This process is evolutionary and necessarily follows two
parallel paths: as the servicing concept evolves, so must the payload
user community evolve to serviceable designs. If payload designers are
slow to alter their course, the benefits of space servicing, both to the
payload and to Shuttle operations, will be delayed because a mature
servicing concept (servicer design) can not be developed without inti-
mate cooperation of the payload community. The inherent inertia in
altering any substantial course of action such as this will more than
likely result in two and perhaps three generations of servicing designs
before a mature concept is achieved. This evolutionary process must
be initiated in the very near future if maturity is to be achieved by the
initial operational capability (IOC) of the Tug.
It is axiomatic that the first step of this evolution should be
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of relatively low cost because the unknowns involved could result in
substantial changes as the process continues. For this reason, it was
recommended that consideration be given to a joint NASA/USAF effort,
mutually beneficial to both parties, with each party assuming a propor-
tionate share of the cost. Current USAF programs offer this advantage.
The Space Test Program (STP) is specifically designed to support new
space equipment developments, providing a flight test platform for
several experiments on a single flight. For these tests, low cost
booster vehicles (ATLAS F) are available to support such operations.
In addition, it is also possible to deploy a piggyback payload on other
USAF launch vehicle operations, e. g., Titan IIIC. Servicing would
then be performed on a subsequent launch wherein module replacements
would allow extended life for the mission.
These concepts have been considered in light of this immed-
iate application as well as the potential to evolve to a mature operational
concept. The objectives of such a pilot program are to demonstrate con-
fidence in the concept, reduce design risks to operational programs, and
to identify any operational problems associated with automated space ser-
vicing. The major thrust of the effort must be directed at involvement of
the payload community to develop confidence in this operational concept.
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2. SPACE SERVICING ANALYSIS
The analysis employed in this effort has been directed at
assessing the economic benefits of space servicing as applied to a
broad spectrum of payloads. Although detail information is not avail-
able for future payload designs, it is possible to assess the general
character of payload operations as defined by the October 1973 NASA
Mission Model, Reference 1. The benefits to be obtained are derived
from two sources. Extending the lifetime of a given payload by replac-
ing a module rather than the entire payload allows a reduction in overall
payload procurement, assuming the reliability characteristics are essen-
tially equivalent for either design. Also, with modules weighing between
50 and 300 kg (100 and 600 lbs), it is possible to perform multiple-pay-
load servicing on any given upper stage flight. This has the potential
to improve overall Shuttle operations, thereby, providing further benefits.
2. 1 RECONFIGURATION FOR SPACE SERVICING
2. 1. 1 Commonality
Achieving these benefits requires a certain commonality of
design for the payloads of interest. This is the first step of the assess-
ment process and has been documented in References 2 and 3, Payload
Designs for Space Servicing, with Addendum. Forty-two payloads of the
reference mission model were reconfigured for space servicing. Repre-
sentative weight and reliability characteristics were developed for each
space replaceable unit (SRU) and non-replaceable unit (NRU). In addition,
various levels of redundancy were employed consistent with expendable
payload designs employed with the reference mission model. Consequently,
the only variance between expendable and space serviceable designs is
reflected in heavier weights due to the modularization of the payloads.
These data are then employed in a Monte Carlo simulation program to
develop random failures of the modules as they could be expected to
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occur in practice across the mission model. A comparison of expend-
able versus space serviceable operations can then be made on a common
basis to assess the relative merits of each.
A general idea of the reconfiguration process can be obtained
from Figure 1. The Earth Observatory Satellite is shown in two concepts.
The original concept is space serviceable within the Shuttle bay but the
modules are relatively large and adaptability to a wide range of payload
operations (e. g., COMSATS), is limited. The modified version employs
smaller modules positioned on a ring frame that allows automated module
exchange. The same equipment exists in both designs; however, the mod-
ules can be standardized for application to other payloads. It is not possi-
ble at this time to say what the optimum design is; however, it is felt that
the module and structural characteristics are representative of what can
be expected no matter what design is accepted. The modules may vary
significantly, depending upon the components, but the interface with the
basic framework (NRU) is standardized. The number of modules per
payload varies between 9 and 27, with an overall average of 13 SRUs per
payload. Over 400 modules are required for the 29 unique payload designs
developed by this effort. Of these, 104 modules are dedicated to mission
equipment and are, therefore, considered unique. The remaining 300 sub-
system SRUs are made up of 213 unique designs. This number can be
reduced to 34 by standardization while still meeting all performance
requirements of the candidate programs.
Principal interest has been placed on geostationary operations
with various Shuttle upper stages. There are 16 different geostationary
payload programs projected in the reference mission model requiring a
total deployment of 114 payloads in the time period of 1980 through 1990.
Of these 16 programs, 13 appear to be reasonable candidates for space ser-
vicing. The reference mission model was developed in a deterministic
manner based upon mean mission duration estimates for expendable pay-
load operations. However, the simulation program employed for this
analysis requires a statistical assessment of the logistic traffic based
upon the individual reliability characteristics of each element of each
payload. Therefore, it is not possible to match exactly the reference
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mission module but the general character of operations is achieved. On
the average, 96 to 98 payloads are deployed over the time period of interest,
with the statistical process versus the 114 payloads mentioned above. Hence,
the statistical estimates are considered valid for the purposes employed in
this effort. These data then form the basis of comparisons with space ser-
vicing operations.
2. 1.2 Approaches
There are several approaches for space servicing operations
that deserve consideration. The important point is to observe the trends
of the analysis results relative to overall payload procurement and upper
stage/Shuttle flight rates. A third parameter is the number of stages
which must be expended due to high weight payloads over the period of
interest since this represents an additional procurement cost.
Space servicing may be conducted by deploying modules to a
number of payloads, retrieving the depleted or failed modules, and return-
ing the modules to the ground station for refurbishment. To simplify the
analysis, the weight of modules retrieved has been assumed to equal that
deployed, which is obviously conservative when considering such items as
propellant modules.
A second alternative is to not return the failed or expended
modules on the belief that standardization of SRUs reduces their cost
sufficiently such that the cost of retrieval and refurbishment is not justi-
fied. The modules would remain in orbit for disposition at some later
date. In actual practice, it probably will be desirable to return mission
equipment modules because of their relatively high cost; however, if new
low cost developments are being deployed, even this becomes questionable.
For ease of analysis, the only item retrieved is the service unit, repre-
sented as a 181 kg (400 lb) unit, which remains attached to the upper
stage and is repeatedly used.
The third alternative is to leave the service unit in orbit
along with the modules which have been replaced. If the service unit
is relatively low in cost, this could be desirable because of the perfor-
mance penality associated with its return. As a rule of thumb, three
kilograms of weight can be deployed to geostationary orbit for every
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kilogram returned. Consequently, this option deserves considera-
tion. It also leads to the possibility of space based servicing opera-
tions. At present, the analysis technique requires the upper stage to
perform all phasing maneuvers to service payloads at various longi-
tudes. A propulsion module on the service unit could perform this
task much more efficiently, thereby enhancing this mode of operation
beyond that shown with this analysis. Although the service unit for
this analysis is expended after completion of the servicing task, the
upper stage is recovered except where heavy payloads preclude this
option. In all cases the upper stage performs the required phasing
maneuvers for multiple servicing operations.
The actual servicing concept employed when the Shuttle
and upper stage become operational will probably be some combina-
tion of each of these three modes. Consequently, it is important in any
such analysis to examine trends of the operational characteristics. The
results can then be compared relative to each option and also to the
current mode of expendable operations. In this way, it is not necessary
to develop exact cost data, (which at this point in time is not practical
for the spectrum of payloads in the NASA mission model) in order to
assess the relative merits of each.
2. 1.3 Cost Benefits
Table I provides the results of this analysis effort in terms
of approximate cost benefits based upon the reference cost data given as
footnotes. The baseline case is given as using an improved transtage
with an apogee kick motor to deploy expendable payloads for the refer-
ence mission model, Reference 4. On the average, 96 expendable pay-
loads are deployed to geosynchronous orbit over the time period of inter-
est based upon a series of Monte Carlo simulations. These payloads
require, on the average, 83 flights of the transtage. It was necessary
to expend 19 transtages because of payload weights which exceeded the
round trip performance capability. All flights required expenditure of
-7-
Table 1. Cost Benefits of Three Space Servicing Options
GEOSYNCHRONOUS ORBIT (1980 - 1990)
OPTIONS OPERATIONS APPROXIMATE BENEFITS
APPROACH PL & & & T
STAGE EXP REC FLTS PROC FLTS PLS STGS COST $M
REF. BASELINE TRANS I KICK V' 83 96 - - 19/83 0
I PAYLOADS CENTAUR V 74 96 9 - - 193
EXPENDED I IFULL CAP TUG /[48 96 35 - - 453
I SPACE SERVICE I CENTAUR 1/ 115 64 -32 32 10 23
RETRIEVE SRUs [FULL CAP TUG / 70 64 13 32 2 533I SPACE SERVICE CENTAUR V 90 64 -7 32 10 273
EXPEND SRUs FULL CAP TUG / 59 64 24 32 2 1 643
SPACE SERV ICE CENTAUR 1/ 81 64 2 32 10 363
EXPEND SUI SRUs FULL CAP TUG / 55 64 28 32 2 683
Benefits to be Applied Against Reference Cost Data
* DDT&E - Payloads and Stages Shuttle/Tug Flt $10M
* Recurring Refurb. Costs Transtage 5M
* Additional Mission Ops. Support Kick Motor 0. 1M
CENTAUR 8M
Full Cap. Tug 10M
Avg. Payload Cost 10M
the kick motor. This then becomes the point of reference for compari-
son relative to overall operational benefits.
A substantial improvement is derived from use of the full
capability Tug (Reference 5) to deploy the same payloads over the same
period. The number of upper stage flights, and hence Shuttle flights,
can be reduced by over 40%. This creates a cost delta or benefit of
approximately $450 million as an average value, which can be applied
against the DDT&E and refurbishment costs of the upper stage. A sub-
stantial improvement is also achieved with the large tank Centaur (28 ft
or 8. 5m in length). Because of its improved performance, it was not
necessary to expend any upper stages; i. e., all payloads could be
deployed and the stage recovered.
When space servicing is employed, the equivalent pay-
load procurement is, on the average, reduced by over 30% while still
meeting all mission requirements. Some of this advantage is dis-
counted though by the increased number of flights required due to the
heavier payload weights associated with space serviceable designs.
If all modules are returned, the incremental savings over expendable
operations with the full capability Tug is an additional $80 million.
This does not include the effect of refurbishing the modules for subse-
quent reuse, which could provide further savings. Equivalent payload
procurement is based up both the number of payloads deployed and a
ratio of the SRUs required to maintain operations. If a non-replace-
able unit fails, it is necessary to replace the entire payload. If one-
third of the SRUs are replaced over the period of interest, it is
assumed that one-third of the average payload cost is incurred. This
ratio, along with a low average payload cost of $10 million, reflects
very conservative cost benefits. The benefits of module refurbish-
ment could provide a further increase in benefits. Since refurbish-
ment costs are very speculative, they have not been incorporated
in this analysis. An estimate of what might be expected is addressed
later in this report.
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Expending the modules, but returning the service unit
accumulates an additional increment of $110 million. The same num-
ber of modules are required in either case. Leaving the SRUs and SUs in
orbit after completing servicing increases the total potential benefits
from space servicing to $230 million. This should be more than ade-
quate to compensate for DDT&E costs to develop space serviceable
designs and servicing equipment. In addition, these results should
be conservative from the standpoint that payload weights have a sub-
stantial margin and the cost employed for Shuttle operations is rela-
tively low. If the average payload costs and the cost of a Shuttle/Upper
Stage flight are increased above $10 million, the benefits from servic-
ing will increase proportionately.
For purposes of comparison, results are also shown for
the large tank Centaur. The excessive boiloff rates preclude its use
for any missions requiring extended periods on orbit. However, as
the return weights are decreased, it becomes easier to absorb the
propellant boiloff and still accomplish the mission. Extending this
point further implies that the large tank Centaur may be a candidate
upper stage if a space based service unit is employed wherein the
Centaur mission duration is minimized.
The conclusions which may be drawn at this time are
that space servicing, over the broad spectrum of applications, will
provide sufficient cost savings to more than compensate for the DDT&E
required to achieve this concept. Recalling that not all payloads were
reconfigured for space servicing, the indication is that a rational mix
of expendable and serviceable operations can be achieved. The total
time period involved is eleven years. If the associated DDT&E to
achieve space servicing can be maintained at $100 million,the concept
pays for itself in less than five years. Or, if only one-half of the
payloads employed in this analysis accept space servicing, the con-
cept is still favored over purely expendable operations. Further,
the analysis results indicate that implementation of any initial concept
- 10-
should not preclude growth to space based operations which hold the
promise of further cost improvements.
2. 2 IMPLEMENTATION
Consideration should be given to implementation of space
servicing relative to the payload program opportunities of the refer-
enced NASA mission model. Figure 2 shows the 16 programs scheduled
for geostationary operations. If space servicing is to be introduced,
it can be expected that a payload program would alter its current design
approach only when a new start or major modification was scheduled.
In this way, the impact on each payload design to incorporate servicing
should be minimized. Since payload programs will accept space ser-
vicing only as it serves their individual needs, it may be several years
after the first serviceable design becomes operational before a large
family of payload programs is accommodated.
The new starts shown in Figure 2 reflect those occurring
after the Shuttle IOC. The first candidate is an explorer payload in
1980, followed by the Synchronous Earth Observatory Satellite in 1981.
It may be possible to also influence one or two of the domestic programs
having new starts in 1981, but the majority of these types of programs
will probably wait until the servicing concept has been demonstrated on
NASA operational programs. The important point, however, is to
examine the general character of new or major program investments
as a function of when space servicing would be introduced as an opera-
tional reality.
This may be more easily recognized by integrating the new
starts as a function of time as shown in Figure 3. Thirty-four new
starts or major revisions have been scheduled over the time period of
interest. Most of these programs involve two or more payloads result-
ing in a total deployment of 96 payloads. The general character of new
starts and payload procurement is reasonably linear. There are no
large peaks or valleys, indicating a relatively stable level of funding to
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Figure 2. NASA and Domestic Geostationary Programs
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Figure 3. Major Payload Program Events
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support a steady growth of activity. This figure also shows that if
space servicing becomes operational with the full capability Tug in
1984, over 70% of the programs could be captured. In addition, if
an interim servicing capability existed prior to this time, other pro-
grams could be captured, providing the foundation to build to the
operational concept in 1984. The economics of interim servicing are
probably not favorable because of performance limitations, but the
experience gained would be very influential on subsequent programs.
This point is very apparent when considering the loss of benefits due
to the delay of introducing space servicing as shown in Figure 4.
The loss in benefits can be substantial if servicing is
delayed until the Tug becomes operational. Nearly 50% of the cost
benefits shown in Table 1 are influenced by the first few years of
activity. This reflects the fact that if a new start is not captured
in the first few years, the opportunity does not present itself again
for another four to six years later. Therefore, those benefits which
would occur during this period, would be lost. This characteristic
holds independent of the servicing concept of interest. Emphasis
should obviously be placed on capturing as much of the early traffic
as possible, again supporting the argument for an interim servicing
capability.
2.3 REFURBISHMENT BENEFITS
It is also important to note that these results should be
considered conservative. Further optimization could be achieved by
improving module weights, the sequence of selecting payloads to be
serviced, and the manner of responding to warning incidents rather
than failure occurrences. The results obtained were sufficiently clear
that further optimization was felt unnecessary at this point in time. As
an example, the results shown have not taken advantage of refurbish-
ment and reuse of space replaceable modules. For the purposes here,
if a payload required five of its 15 SRUs to be replaced over its opera-
- 13 -
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Figure 4. Cost Impact of Delaying Space Servicing
tional lifetime, it was assumed that one-third of the cost of a new pay-
load was incurred. This conservatism was selected because future
payload programs are only speculative at this time, with very little
hard design information available. However, it is well known that
subsystem modules should be less expensive than mission equipment
modules, and also that the non-replaceable unit (structure, solar
panels, highly reliable components) will be a substantial part of the
payload cost. Consequently, replacing five modules, of a 15-module
payload, may only represent 20% or less of a total payload buy, thereby
inherently providing further benefits beyond those derived in this analysis.
Although the cost benefits of refurbishing and reusing
space replaceable modules are vague because of numerous uncertain-
ties, it is possible to gain some insight on this subject in the following
manner. If the total number of SRUs required over the time period of
interest could be refurbished for 30% of their original costs on the aver-
age, the improved benefits would be as indicated in Figure 4. The
savings of $83 million would be increased to approximately $150 million:
an improvement of nearly 100%. However, for the conditions employed
here, these savings still do not match the benefits associated with no
retrieval of the SRUs, also shown in Figure 4. This is brought about
by the impact on the Tug performance associated with geostationary
retrieval operations, forcing an increase in the number of flights to
satisfy the same servicing requirements. It is further noted that even
if refurbishment costs were zero, it would still be more advantageous
to expend the modules on the average. Of course, this is based upon
an average payload cost of $10 million. If the cost is substantially
higher than this, the pattern could reverse. This is only an average
though, and in specific cases retrieval and refurbishment should be
considered, especially if excess Tug performance exists at the time of
interest.
In summary, the results of this analysis indicate that
preparations for space servicing should be initiated immediately in
- 15 -
order to capture a majority of new program starts in the 1980 time
period. It requires three to five years to develop a new payload. Before
a given payload program will accept space servicing, it will be necessary
to provide convincing evidence that benefits are real and the associated
risk is low. This will require an additional two to three years, result-
ing in an overall period of time of five to eight years before substantial
progress can be seen. Consequently, the only rational approach is felt
to be one of timely evolution from an initial proof test to a mature opera-
tional concept coincident with payload program acceptance. If this pro-
cess is not initiated in the immediate future, numerous payload programs
will be lost to space servicing if not totally, at least until a subsequent
generation arrives.
The major obstacle that must be overcome is the inertia
inherent within the payload community to alter their current course
of operations. Their involvement at the beginning of this evolutionary
process is essential to assure acceptance. The initial test case may
be unsophisticated, with its objective to develop confidence in the con-
cept. However, the selected concept should also meet at least the
following criteria:
a. Constraints to be imposed upon payload design
and operations must be minimized, recognizing
that both standard and non-standard interfaces
may exist.
b. The selected servicing concept should not pre-
clude growth to space based operations
since the economics favor this direction.
If these objectives can be achieved, there should be a
great deal of activity for space servicing and maintenance of future
space programs at all orbital altitudes including manned and auto-
mated operations.
Future applications are discussed briefly in the next
section of this report followed by pilot program options.
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3. PROGRAMMATIC ASPECTS
Any new concept under consideration should be viewed in
light of its contribution to the total space effort. Therefore, it is felt
desirable to consider the place of space servicing in the overall scheme
of future space operations, what growth capability should exist, and
what development schedule is necessary to achieve a mature operational
status.
3. 1 OVERALL SPACE EFFORT
The overall technology involved in developing a space ser-
vicing and maintenance capability must embrace a wide variety of new
program options. Manned maintenance activities in low altitude orbits
have been a serious consideration for some time and have been rein-
forced by the recent success of the Skylab operations. Continued devel-
opment of this capability can be expected to follow the path shown in
Figure 5. Current studies and development efforts will inherently lead
to large free-flying spacecraft such as the Large Space Telescope
which require periodic and possibly unscheduled maintenance operations.
Retrieval of hard copy data, replenishment of consumables, and adjust-
ment or realignment of instruments are typical manned operations.
This should eventually lead to assembly of large structures
in space, either as manned or unmanned spacecraft but certainly involv-
ing manned support for the assembly process. This development process
seems inevitable to achieve more efficient space operations. Spacecraft
will inherently become larger and more complex and incorporate a wide
spectrum of mission equipment. In this way, multi-mode operations
can be performed with a single platform rather than creating new space-
craft each time a state-of-the-art improvement is achieved in sensor
developments. The benefits of manned servicing can be both in mainte-
nance and management of the platform operations.
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A similar scenario exists for geostationary operations; how-
ever, upper stage performance capabilities will force servicing opera-
tions to be primarily automated for a period of time until the need for
manned maintenance is justified. The overall technology evolves from
current study efforts of various servicing concepts and the impact on
payload design efforts. This evolves, among other things, into a pilot
program as possibly the first step of this evolutionary process.
3.2 GROWTH CAPABILITY
Following a Pilot Program, the next step is to provide an
interim servicing capability to support those initial space serviceable
payloads introduced in the early 1980 time period. A full servicing capa-
bility then evolves when the full capability Tug becomes operational.
This growth should continue as more and more payload
programs take advantage of space servicing economic benefits. As the
payload community expands, the need for space based operations to
satisfy these servicing requirements may possibly lead to warehousing
of modules on orbit. A possible space based servicing unit (SSU) is
shown in Figure 6. This unit could be a direct copy of the equipment
employed in the initial pilot and interim servicing programs.
The propulsion unit, with an avionics package, would be
supplied with a service unit and replacement modules by a Tug flight
to geostationary orbit. The space based unit performs all rendezvous
and docking functions with the Tug, acquiring the service unit and
modules. The SSU then transfers from one payload to another, perform-
ing servicing as needed. The performance of this unit is such that several
payloads could be serviced over a period of 10 to 20 days. When servic-
ing is completed, the SSU loiters, waiting for another Tug flight.
One other point is indicated with this schematic. The pay-
loads being serviced will probably consist of both standard and non-stan-
dard modules. This appears unavoidable because of the wide variance in
mission equipment which may be employed. Consequently, the service
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unit may require both a hard dock as well as a stand-off capability for
exchanging modules. The hard dock approach is desired to minimize
the uncertainties in locating and replacing modules; however, over-
sized modules may require manipulators for removal and installation.
The modules and SSU may be returned for refurbishment or discarded
in space depending upon overall economic considerations.
Further growth is available by extending this concept to a
solar electric propulsion stage, SEPS, as shown in Figure 7. The per-
formance efficiency in a space based mode is unparalleled. The time
to phase from one longitude to another is very competitive with a chem-
ical propulsion stage and its inherently long life and high specific impulse
make an excellent combination for this task. In addition, if large pay-
load weights exceed the Tug capability, the SEPS can transfer to a
lower altitude, retrieve the payload, and place it in geostationary orbit.
The same service module could be employed as previously shown, add-
ing extra wafers of magazines as needed. The capability offered by this
vehicle cannot be denied. It is necessary, however, to develop the ser-
vicing system to go with it, hence the earlier statement that any such
development should not preclude growth to space based operation.
Finally, as payloads become more complex and highly sophis-
ticated, it is inevitable that direct manned maintenance operations will be
required. If prior operations evolve properly, extending man's region of
influence to geostationary orbit should represent a natural occurrence. In
this event, a tandem tug operation will be required taking advantage of the
space assembly techniques previously developed in low earth orbit. Tandem
tug operations can provide a round trip capability of approximately 5, 000 kg
(11, 000 lb). A two-man service capsule as shown in Figure 8 is estimated
conservatively to weigh 3, 200 kg (7, 000 lb), leaving approximately 1, 800 kg
(4, 000 lb) of payload for servicing operations. Duration of the operation as
envisioned here would be seven days to remain compatible with the Shuttle/
Tug design constraint. Sufficient reserves exist for an additional 10 to
14 days in the event of a tug failure on orbit. Both stages of the tandem
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tug would be recovered.
In summary, there is a direct link between low earth orbit
manned operations which extends eventually to manned geostationary
missions. Until such time that the demand will justify it, however,
high altitude servicing missions will have to be performed with auto-
mated or semi-automated vehicles that can remove and replace spe-
cific modules. The process of arriving at this capability is discussed
next.
3.3 DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE
Space servicing developments should precede by a very
short period of time the payload development efforts, as indicated in
Figure 9. The rationale for this lies in the belief that payload develop-
ers will be hesitant to alter their design approach unless a service con-
cept has been demonstrated. However, if the service system matures
too rapidly, it is inevitable that the service mechanism will impose con-
straints upon the payload design, thereby inhibiting the acceptance of
the concept within the payload user community. For these reasons, a
three-phase development is postulated.
The first phase is a low cost pilot program with a simpli-
fied service unit concept and operating on low cost experimental pay-
loads. The results of this test case feed directly into the first genera-
tion service unit design effort, and also into a limited number of new
payload program starts. These are operational programs which can
be serviced on an interim basis pending development of a full capa-
bility Tug. After a year or two of operational experience, it should be
possible to convince domestic programs to accept space servicing.
However, at this point they may want to impose new requirements for
servicing thereby leading to a second generation, or mature servicing
concept. Extrapolating beyond this time to space based operations is
only dependent upon the size of the community to be serviced as
opposed to any substantial new developments.
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The three phases dovetail very well into a total program plan
development schedule as shown in Figure 10. The pilot program needs
to be accomplished by early 1978 to input test results into the first gener-
ation service unit development. In fact, it is very problematical that the
Phase C hardware procurement can be initiated without the pilot program
inputs because of the lack of support from the payload community. The
pilot program has to stimulate payload development efforts, otherwise,
there will be no payloads to service when interim servicing becomes
operational because of associated lead time requirements.
Low earth orbit servicing could be demonstrated late in
1980 with a geostationary operation in 1981. An experimental payload
(explorer class) could be deployed piggyback on a normal upper stage
flight. Subsequently, servicing could be performed by the interim upper
stage with a piggyback service unit and modules. This would be the first
demonstration of the full operational sequence, including longitudinal
phasing maneuvers. By this time, the foundation should exist for a
second generation development effort to arrive at a mature servicing
concept, to be developed in conjunction with the full capability Tug.
During this development effort, servicing could be performed by the
interim upper stage as required. Although it may not be economical,
due to performance limitations, it would provide support for those pay-
load programs that are willing to accept the risk prior to the IOC of the
full capability Tug.
This schedule does not allow any substantial margin for
delay. If a full servicing capability is not instituted early in the Shuttle
era, the cost benefits previously identified will be lost. A delay in
initiating positive action will result in greater inertia within the pay-
load community and, as previously pointed out, payload technology
must parallel servicing system developments. It is not rational to
expect at the initiation of the first servicing system development that
a broad spectrum of payloads will have accepted space servicing. Design
requirements will invariably evolve at a later date which cannot be
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ignored and which must be accommodated by the next generation. The
overall effort needs to be initiated immediately to have any hope of an
orderly progression that can build from one plateau to another. Options
which can support this process are discussed in the following sections.
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4. PILOT PROGRAM OPTIONS
4. 1 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of a pilot program are often arbitrary and
must eventually evolve to a management level because the decision to
initiate the stepwise process to develop a new operational concept is,
on the whole, a management level decision. There are no insurmount-
able technical problems and arguments based solely on the technical
aspects of this decision process will miss the true benefits that can
accrue from the proposed pilot program. There are several approaches
which may be employed to investigate specific technical details, but the
major objective is to achieve a cooperative effort which involves both
the Shuttle/upper stage developing agency and the payload development
agencies. In this way, servicing can progress as a unified effort. One
method is through a cooperative flight test pilot program as presented in
this report. The urgency for initiating such action has already been dis-
cussed in preceeding sections. However, the question invariably arises
as to why an investment is required in a pilot program as opposed to
other alternatives.
In response to this question, the following arguments for
a pilot program are offered for management's consideration.
a. A pilot program is required to develop confidence in the
concept of space servicing before the payload community
will alter their course of activities.
b. A pilot program is required to demonstrate that the design
risks, which must be accepted by the payload community,
are not substantial and that through this effort those "risks"
can be reduced.
c. A pilot program is required to identify fundamental opera-
tional problems associated with automated space servicing
which can never be adequately demonstrated by ground
simulation efforts.
d. A pilot program is required because a properly managed
low cost effort early in the development process can sub-
stantially reduce subsequent development costs by early
involvement of the payload community to focus on their
individual and collective needs when operating with the
Shuttle system.
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Placing these arguments in context with the development
schedule shown previously emphasizes the importance of timing to
arrive at a mature space servicing concept when the full capability
Tug becomes operational. Although the design process in any one
phase can be shortened, this is not likely to increase acceptance by
the payload community. On the contrary, an early design freeze may
minimize acceptance and utilization if it convinces payload users the
space servicing concept cannot meet their needs effectively. A pilot
program has the potential to overcome this reluctance with a relatively
low investment in keeping with a stepwise "crawl before you walk"
development plan. Therefore, the next subject is what options are
available for management consideration as an initial step and what
investment is required.
The first consideration of a low cost program is to utilize
existing equipment wherever possible to reduce development costs. A
second factor is to share overall program costs by accomplishing other
objectives in addition to space servicing with a single operation. With
this in mind, it was possible to develop a matrix of test objectives
versus hardware concepts. Two approaches were selected for consi-
deration. Each meets a number of test objectives but to varying degrees.
One option employs a primary satellite and a maneuvering unit on a
single flight, demonstrating terminal rendezvous and docking, modular
exchange, and interface verification. This option has been identified
as the WTR option and will be covered below. The second option
employs two flights: an initial payload deployment followed after a time
interval by a second flight to replace modules and extend the payload
operation. This is identified as the ETR option described in section 4. 3.
4.2 WTR OPTION
The first option, operating from the Western Test Range
(WTR) at Vandenburg Air Force Base, is shown schematically in Figure
11. This operation would be performed in conjunction with the USAF
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Space Test Program (STP) with responsibility for all USAF activi-
ties to be managed by that office. The launch vehicle would be an
Atlas F/Burner II combination. Atlas F vehicles are currently in
storage and available to support STP operations at low cost. A
total of 1280 kg (2820 lb) can be placed into a 740 km (400 nmi) orbit
with an inclination of 70 degrees. Of this, approximately 400 kg
(870 lb) is available for STP or NASA experiments over and above
the space demonstration requirements.
After insertion into orbit, the propulsion unit would be
maneuvered to a position approximately 185 km (100 nmi) away from
the primary payload. Rendezvous systems would be employed to
perform the closure and docking maneuver. The operation can be
performed repeatedly to develop operational envelopes, impact loads,
sensor characteristics, etc. Ground support would be available
through the USAF Satellite Control Facility (SCF) with the capability
to support a video link and uplink command to interact with onboard
systems.
Candidate hardware is shown in the next few figures.
The primary satellite could be the basic satellite body of the USAF
STP P72-2 program (Figure 12) currently scheduled for launch in
mid- January 1975. With the STP experiments removed, this vehicle
has a diameter of approximately 1.5 m (5 ft) and a length of approxi-
mately 1.5 m (5 ft). Three axis stabilization and a wide band com-
munication system are provided along with power and thermal condi-
tioning. This vehicle is manufactured by Rockwell International.
Selection of this vehicle, among others, would rest with the USAF
STP office and depend upon the overall mission objectives.
The propulsion unit could be a Minuteman fourth stage,
as shown in Figure 13. This unit is currently in production at Bell
Aerospace Company and is capable of transferring 454 kg (1000 lb) of
payload through a velocity increment of 305 m/sec (1000 fps). Vehicle
weight, including an avionics package, is estimated to weigh 317 kg
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(700 Ib). Both vehicles can be packaged within the existing fairing of
the P72-2 program.
Further consideration was given to a useful experiment
that could be conducted in conjunction with the space servicing opera-
tions. One such test could be laser communications. A test flight has
already been requested by the cognizant USAF office for the 1978 time
period. The test, as currently envisioned, would be limited to a space
to ground link. A candidate hardware concept is shown in Figure 14.
If this effort were combined with the servicing program, the laser
test could be expanded to cover the space link. This is shown sche-
matically by Figure 15. After completion of the servicing functions,
the propulsion unit (PSRE) has sufficient performance to alter its
orbital altitude to approximately 1480 km (800 nmi). Nodal regres-
sion will separate the orbits, and a test range of over 7400 km (4000
nmi) can be achieved.
These elements, for the most part, represent existing
designs, if not existing equipment. The overall schedule for design,
fabrication, and testing is shown in Figure 16, leading to a flight test
in the first part of 1978. The schedule shown for the P72-2 vehicle is
derived from current program experience and is reasonably represen-
tative of any hardware procurement cycle, given that the equipment has
been previously qualified. The propulsion unit (PSRE) has also been
developed but the avionics would require a new effort. Existing avion-
ics, similar to that of the P 72-2 vehicle, would be adequate except
for the rendezvous sensors. These have been identified as GFE from
NASA, since this requirement already exists for the tug, although the
time period has been advanced.
This leaves the major new development effort for the
service unit itself. The design must necessarily be simple to be com-
patible with the other vehicles; hence, an 18-month development is not
unrealistic. The major concern is for test and integration to assure
that a flight qualified product is achieved; eight to 10 months have been
allowed for this. The overall program plan requires approximately
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Table 2. Funding Requirements for Space Servicing Pilot Program
PROGRAM FUNDING $M
FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 TOTAL
USAF NASA USAF NASA USAF NASA USAF NASA
1. MISSION SPECIFICATIONS
MISSION REQ 0.100
STP P.O. INTERFACE REQ 0.130
NASA CENTERS SUPPORT - -
2. HARDWARE DEFINITION PHASE
P72-2 VEHICLE & INTEGRATION 1.2
PSRE VEHICLEIAV IONICS 0.3
SERVICE UNITISRU DESIGN ' 0.8
RENDEZVOUS SENSORS (TUG PROGRAM)
INTEGRATION SUPPORT 0.6 0.6
3. HARDWARE PROCUREMENT
LAUNCH SERVICES 0.5 2.0 0.5 2.0
P72-2 VEHICLE 4.0 2.0
PSRE VEHICLE 1.0
SERVICE UNIT 1.2
INTEGRATION SUPPORT 0.8 0.6
EXPER IMENTS
4. INTEGRATED TEST PROGRAM
SYSTEMS TESTS 1.0 1.0
FLIGHT TEST 1.0 2.0
DATA ANALYS IS/SUPPORT 0.5 2.0
TOTAL NASA 0. 10 1.7 5.3 5.0 12.1
USAF 0.13 2.3 6.8 4.5 13.73
o POTENTIAL SUPPORT FROM SPAR
';ADDITIONAL FUNDS AVAILABLE UNDER LINE
SRIG P; 
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30 months of effort.
It has been assumed that development of the primary sat-
ellite (P 72-2 vs alternatives) would be the responsibility of the USAF STP
Office because this vehicle must be compatible with other USAF experi-
ments and fit within budget allocations. Modifications to this vehicle to
support space servicing would be funded by NASA. The propulsion unit
with avionics and the docking and servicing mechanisms would also be a
NASA responsibility. Integration, testing and launch costs would be
shared. A complete breakdown of total costs based upon these ground
rules is provided in Table 2. These costs represent the equipment as it
exists today with some slight margins to accommodate a rise in costs in
the future. The estimated cost sharing is also shown. The total program
cost is estimated to be approximately $26 million.
Several points need to be made regarding this table. Per-
haps the most important is that, although these costs represent con-
tractor inputs and are consistent with previous program experience,
there is still an inherent uncertainty due to the current wave of infla-
tion. In addition, integration efforts are not definable at this time and
tend to cloud the picture. Therefore, the funding plan has been organ-
ized such that the major costs are not incurred until after PDR or CDR
for most of the hardware elements. Funding in FY 75 establishes mis-
sion requirements. Funding in FY 76 establishes the design approach,
the DoD experiment support requirements, the interface specifications,
and the test requirements. At this time, it is possible to firm up the
remaining costs for FY 77 and FY 78 and to select the remaining course
of action. By the end of FY 76, it will also be possible to determine the
degree to which various payload offices are willing to support the pilot
program efforts. The investment to this point is between 10 and 15 per-
cent of the effort.
In addition, it has been determined that spare PSRE vehicles
may exist in the USAF inventory. It appears very likely that one or two
units could be released to NASA without cost for this effort. Even in
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the event this does not occur, a late input gives the current cost of
the PSRE at $500 thousand instead of $1 million as shown in the table.
Also, certain avionic components have been given to NASA (Reference 6
from the recently cancelled Earth Limb Measurement Satellite Program
(ELMS). These components could be employed for either the PSRE
avionics wafer or to reduce the cost of the P 72-2 primary satellite.
The cost savings accrued by this action is estimated to be between one
and two million dollars. If all of the equipment requested had been
transferred to NASA, the cost savings in hardware alone would exceed
2. 5 million dollars with additional manpower support savings.
In summary, this option has several features which sup-
port the argument to initiate the effort immediately at a minimum of
risk relative to a full commitment of funds.
a. Timing is favorable to provide inputs to the major ser-
vicing effort.
b. Existing hardware can be employed to a large extent.
c. Commitment of funds is low until final cost and design
data is available.
d. Spare PSREs may be available to reduce costs from
those shown.
e. Spare components have already been transferred to NASA
providing additional cost savings.
4.3 ETR OPTION
The ETR option shares many of the same advantages; how-
ever, the total cost to NASA will be somewhat higher. A schematic of
this option is shown in Figure 17. A serviceable payload is deployed
in the transtage parking orbit as a piggyback payload on a programmed
USAF mission. A subsequent flight after six months of operation would
be performed using a Delta vehicle. The propulsion unit (PSRE), a
service unit, and replacement modules would be deployed and servic-
ing performed. This option has the additional advantages of more com-
plete rendezvous operations and a demonstration of extending the opera-
tional life of a payload.
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Figure 17. ETR Pilot Program Option
Again existing equipment would be employed wherever
possible and the same comments apply for the PSRE and ELMs compo-
nents. Details of the remaining equipment are shown in Figure 18. A
preliminary design has been performed by the Titan III contractor indi-
cating that a 48-inch wafer section can be inserted at the interface of the
Transtage. A version of a standard space vehicle (SSV), currently under
study at SAMSO, could be modified for servicing and ejected as shown.
This satellite would conduct STP experiments just as the WTR option,
although the SSV satellite would. be slightly smaller to meet the con-
straints of the Titan III wafer. The size restriction, however, should
not preclude performing the recommended laser communication experi-
ment, although this subject requires more effort. There may be alter-
natives as yet not explored.
The total cost of this option is estimated to be approximately
$28 million as shown in Table 3. The service unit, serviceable satellite,
and Titan III wafer are new design items. In addition, rendezvous avionics
has been incorporated into the cost of the service vehicle system, rather
than regarding this as a GFE item. This option is under consideration by
SAMSO relative to their degree of participation, but it appears that NASA
would be required to absorb 70% or more of the program. This cost
must be viewed in light of the increased benefits derived from this option,
which are the full rendezvous and actual lifetime extension of an operating
satellite. The development schedule would be very similar to that prev-
iously shown for the first option.
4.4 COMPARISONS
There are no severe hardware problems apparent in either
option. Either approach offers the capability to initiate the developmental
process to eventually arrive at a mature space servicing concept. In addi-
tion, it is also possible to acquire an interim servicing capability using
the same components employed for the pilot program. This interim ser-
vicing capability would fulfill an important role in bringing space servic-
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Figure 18. ETR Option Hardware.Elements
Table 3. Cost Estimate of ETR Option
HARDWARE ELEMENT COST $M
* SERV ICE VEHICLE 10.0
/ PROPULSION
/ ASTRIONICS
/ SERVICE UNIT
* SERV ICEABLE SATELLITE 7.0
* TIIIC -WAFER STRUCTURE 2.0
* INTEGRATION 2.0
* LAUNCH COST (DELTA) 6.5
* PHASE I DEFINITION 1.0
TOTAL 28. 5
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ing to an operational reality for two reasons. Payloads to be deployed
prior to 1984 could be designed for servicing, thereby providing a pro-
gressive buildup of programs that could take advantage of the full capa-
bility Tug when it becomes available. Many of these payloads may not
require servicing prior to the Tug IOC but a capability for space servic-
ing should be incorporated. Otherwise, the process of converting pay-
load designs to serviceable concepts will be delayed for years.
An equally cogent reason is that providing this support
capability will exercise the full spectrum of operational procedures,
including plane change maneuvers, servicing time lines, and retrieval
by the Shuttle. This effort, besides providing a service to operational
payloads, will provide the needed experience to make full utilization
of the Tug when operational. The interim capability becomes the train-
ing ground in this evolutionary process.
Figure 19 provides a comparison of interim and full space
servicing configurations. The propulsion unit (PSRE) employed for the
pilot program can be employed for interim servicing as well. The per-
formance capability of the interim upper stage (IUS) is more than ade-
quate to provide this capability and may in fact be able to service more
than one payload on a given flight. The service unit itself should be
more advanced than that employed in the pilot program, taking advan-
tage of that experience and reflecting the character of the payloads to
be serviced. Interim servicing may not be economical by itself, but
it provides the foundation to achieve a high yield early in the Tug opera-
tional time period.
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Figure 19. Interim and Full Capability Servicing Concepts
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The process of developing any new operational concept,
such as space servicing, will inherently require many years of dedi-
cated effort. However, the results of this analysis indicate that this
dedication will provide substantial benefits in terms of future space
flight operations. It also indicates that the shift from current expend-
able payload concepts to space servicing will probably follow an evolu-
tionary process and that this process must be initiated in the very near
future if progress is to be seen in the 1980 - 1990 time period. Any
substantial delay sustains a significant loss in benefits which is irre-
versable. In consequence, it is recommended that NASA management
take immediate action to develop a firm plan of approach leading to an
operational capability in the early 1980 time frame.
Several options may be available for management consid-
eration. The pilot program proposed in this report was prepared for
the specific purpose of determining if this approach represented a viable
alternative to those options which may already be under consideration.
It is felt that this concept not only satisfies the need for early payload
user interaction but also provides a rational approach to evolve to a
full capability when the TUG becomes operational.
The results provided in this report indicate that on a con-
servative basis over $200 million can be saved over an 11-yr period by
employing space servicing. Further optimization of the payload designs
and operational procedures should provide a substantial improvement
in these benefits. These savings can be applied to the developmental
effort required to achieve this capability. Although no firm estimate
of DDT&E costs can be made, it is apparent that even these conserva-
tive returns will be sufficient to justify the effort. However, experience
has shown that any major change of course such as this must be an evolu-
tionary process, allowing confidence to be developed prior to a full commit-
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ment of efforts. Experience has also shown that this process will.require
several years to achieve an operational capability and that two or more
design generations will be required to reach maturity.
Payload programs will not automatically accept a new opera-
tional concept. The economic benefits must be proven and applied against
the anticipated risk that is inherent in any new process. This requires a
demonstration effort, involving payload users to overcome the inertia
involved with current practices. Such a program must also provide the
first step to broader applications and assure that the initial investment
has a relatively high chance of subsequent benefits.
A program plan has been presented which accomplishes
these objectives with a relatively low investment. Two options have been
developed which have application to both NASA and USAF future program
efforts and, therefore, through shared funding provide a capability which
probably could not be achieved otherwise. Although specific design
approaches have been shown, it is not the intent to specify a preferred
approach at this point in time. It is important to note, however, that
existing equipment can be employed to a very large extent, minimizing
the risk of new developmental items. It is also important to recognize
that this program has the potential to evolve directly into an interim ser-
vicing capability, providing not only fundamental design requirements but
also hardware elements,
Finally, a point should be made regarding funding levels.
The total effort is estimated to cost approximately $25 million shared by
NASA and the USAF. Full commitment to these funds is not required
until firm design approaches and cost data are available from contractor
efforts. An initial effort is recommended in the last half of FY 75 to
establish mission requirements and design specifications and to develop
the procurement package for FY 76. The funding levels for FY 76 require
approximately $2 million each from NASA and the USAF. However, only
about one-half of this is required to reach the critical design review
(CDR) on all development items. At that point in time, the design will be
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firm, the interface specifications will be firm, and firm costing can be
committed. The decision can then be made to proceed or reprogram as
necessary. Hence, the commitment up to this time is little more than
the current study efforts investigating various space servicing concepts.
Experience has shown that study results alone will not alter
the course of current payload program efforts. Operational procedures
must be demonstrated and the associated risk of development must be
overcome. This is the first step in developing confidence in a new opera-
tional concept which should provide benefits to the payload user as well
as to the Space Transportation System.
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